Representing Causatives by Pylkkanen, Liina
1. Introduction 
Representing Causatives 
Liina Pylkkanen 
Massachusetts Institute o/ Technology 
Any theory about the basic elements of argument structure must take a stand on 
how the semantic and syntactic composition of causative predicates, such as the 
one in ( 1a), relates to that of their noncausative counterparts, ( 1b). 
( 1 )  a. John melted the ice. 
b. The ice melted. 
In this paper I consider three different approaches to this question and defend one 
of them. The approaches I discuss are all variations of the basic idea that causative 
predicates involve a causative head that is absent from the structure of the 
corresponding noncausative. 1 My aim here is to make a proposal about the 
argument structure of this causative head. Ideally, the argument structure would 
be uniform crosslinguistically. This in mind, I will first make a proposal for 
Japanese and Finnish, where empirical evidence distinguishing between the three 
positions is clear, and then extend the analysis to English. But to show what the 
data to be presented bear on, I will start by laying out three possible trees for ( l a) .  
2.  Three trees 
To propose an argument structure for the causative head, we must decide what the 
linguistic elements are that stand in the CAUSE relation to each other. The three 
positions that III discuss only differ in what is syntactically and/or semantically 
considered the causer. With respect to the other argument of CAUSE, i .e .  what is 
caused, III assume that it is an event, as in Parsons 1990, and not a proposition, as 
in Dowty 1979. I won't defend this position here but refer the reader to Parsons 's 
book (1990: 107- 109). 
A question intimately connected with determining the nature of the causer is 
whether causative constructions assert the existence of one or two events . A 
bieventive analysis of causatives follows traditional analyses in philosophy and 
holds that causation, i .e. the linguistic relation CAUSE, is a relation between two 
events (Parsons 1990) . An opposing view denies the existence of two event 
arguments in structures such as ( la) and relates the causer to the caused event via 
a Causer theta role (e.g. Doron 1999) . My purpose in this section is to spell out 
the details of these positions and to compare their predictions. I first lay out two 
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syntactic executions of the bieventive analysis, then discuss the view where 
CAUSE is a theta-role and finally show how we can distinguish between the three 
positions . 
2. 1 Bieventive analyses 
In a bieventive analysis of causatives, the meaning of ( 1  a) is roughly as in ( l a) :  
( 1 )  a .  John melted the ice. 
a' . John was an agent of some event that caused a melting of the ice. 
Here a causative sentence has two relations that the corresponding noncausative 
does not have: a causation relation relating the causing event to the caused event 
and a thematic relation between the causing event and the individual expressed as 
the external argument (Parsons 1990). 
This meaning can be spelled out in two different ways in the syntax, 
depending on our assumptions about the introduction of external arguments . If we 
assume that external arguments are arguments of verbs, then the causative head, 
which I assume to be of verbal category, introduces both the causing event and the 
external argument, as in (2) . 
(2) CAUSE-P A.e. (3e') [Ving(e')& CAUSE(e,e') & Agent(e,x)] 
---------
x CAUSE' h.A.e. (3e') [Ving(e')& CAUSE(e,e') & Agent(e,x)] 
----------
CAUSE A.e.Ving . . .  
M<S.I>.
A.x.A.e. (3e') [Ving(e')& � 
CAUSE(e,e') & Agent(e,x)] V 
If, however, we assume that external arguments are not argument of verbs, 
but rather arguments of a separate functional element, as in Kratzer 1994 and 
much subsequent work, the causing event and its agent would be introduced by 
two different heads. In the tree in (4) I take the external argument introducing 
head to be Kratzer's Voice, whose denotation is the thematic relation between the 
external argument and the event described by the verb. This meaning then 
combines with its complement via Event Identification, which is a conjunction 
operation allowing us to relate a participant to the event described by the 
complement of Voice. 
(3) a. Event Identification 
<e,<s,t» <s,t> ---7 <e,<s,t» 
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(4) VoiceP Ae. (3e') [Ving(e')& CAUSE(e,e' )  & Agent(e,x)] 
--------
x Voice' Ax.Ae. (3e') [Ving(e')& CAUSE(e,e' )  & Agent(e,x)] 
--------
Voice CAUSE-P Ae.(3e') [Ving(e' )&CAUSE(e,e' ) ]  
Ax.Ae.Agent(e,x) __________ 
CAUSE Ae.Ving . . .  
M<s,I>.Ae. (3e' ) [Ving(e')& � 
CAUSE(e,e')] V 
In other words, we can treat causation and the external theta-role as forming a 
lexical unit, i .e . a morpheme, or we can have the two relations enter the syntax 
separately. In what follows I will refer to these two analyses as the one-headed 
and the two-headed bieventive analysis, respectively. 
2.2 A monoeventive analysis 
In a monoeventive analysis of causatives, the meaning of ( l a) is roughly as in 
( la") :  
( 1 )  a .  John melted the ice. 
a" . John was the causer of a melting of the ice. 
Here the causative sentence only has one relation that the corresponding 
noncausative does not have, i.e. the Causer theta-role. This view yields the tree in 
(5), where the Causer-relation between the caused event and the external 
argument is treated as one possible interpretation of Voice (Doron 1999): 
(5) VoiceP Ae. [Ving(e')& Causer(e,x)] 
--------
x Voice' Ax.Ae. [Ving(e')& Causer(e,x)] 
--------
Voice Ae. [Ving(e')]  
Ax.Ae.Causer(e,x) __________ 
This structure asserts that there is some individual that stands in the Cause­
relation to the event described by the complement of Voice. The DP argument in 
the specifier of Voice could describe an event, as in The rain flooded the house, 
but, crucially, the head introducing the causative meaning, i .e . Voice, introduces 
no new event argument.2 Rather, the event argument of Voice is identified with 
the event argument of its complement. Causativization in this view thus equals the 
introduction of an external argument. 
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2.3 Predictions 
2.3. 1 Causativization and external arguments 
The obvious way in which the three proposals sketched above differ is with 
respect to their predictions about the relationship between causativization and the 
introduction of external arguments . 
In the view where CAUSE is an external theta-role, i .e . (5), it is clear that 
causatives without an external argument cannot exist. In other words, whenever 
the external argument is not present in the syntax, the structure must be a passive. 
It should be spelled out with the typical passive morphology of the language and 
an implicit external argument should be diagnozable with, for example, a by­
phrase or a purpose clause. Thus, in the theta-role theory, a causative which does 
not have a specifier in the syntax must always have a passive Voice-head, i .e . a 
Voice-head that introduces an existentially closed external argument, (6 , ) .3 
(6) The ice was melted (on purpose by John). 
(6' )  Voice' Ae. [Ving(e')& Causer(e,x)] 
--------
Voice Ae. [Ving(e') ]  
Ae.(3x)Causer(e,x) _________ 
The syntactic execution of the bieventive view in which the causing event 
and the external argument are introduced in one head makes the same empirical 
prediction as the theta-role view although for a different reason. In the one-headed 
bieventive analysis ,  the causative head is a transitive verb taking an internal 
argument (a function from the caused event to truth values) and an external 
argument. Thus, under this view, causativization always means introducing an 
external argument but not because causativization is equated with the introduction 
of an external argument but because the causative head takes an external argument 
(in the pre-Kratzer- 1994 sense). Again, whenever this external argument is not 
expressed in the syntax, the structure is predicted to have all the properties of a 
regular passive. 
The two-headed bieventive analysis , on the other hand, does allow for 
causatives without an external argument. Such a structure would have a causative 
head but no Voice-head: 
(7) CAUSE-P Ae.(3e') [Ving(e')&CAUSE(e,e')] 
---------
CAUSE Ae.Ving . . .  
A(s,I>.Ae. (3e' ) [Ving(e')& � 
CAUSE(e,e')] V 
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This structure would have a causative meaning while failing all tests for the 
existence of an external argument, such as passivization. It other words, it would 
be an unaccusative causative. In this paper I argue that the structure in (7) is 
indeed attested but before doing so I will point to another place where the analyses 
under discussion can be teased apart. 
2.3. 1 Possible interpretations of CAUSE-P 
The two-headed bieventive analysis differs from the other proposals also with 
respect to the possible interpretations of a CAUSE-P without a syntactic specifier. 
In particular, I am interested in the possible interpretations of the implicit cause in 
a structure such as the one in (8). 
(8) CAUSE-P 
� 
CAUSE � 
Under the theta-role view, the causative head in (8) would implicitly introduce 
an external argument. This implicit argument should have all the possible 
interpretations that an active version of the predicate would have. In other words, 
we should be able to interpret the implicit argument either as an event participant, 
as in John melted the ice, or as an event, as in The rain flooded the house. The 
structure would be a passive and would simply say that there is somebody or 
something that stands in a causal relation to the event described by the 
complement of the causative Voice-head. Thus there should not be any 
restrictions with respect to the nature of this implicit cause, contextual 
considerations aside. 
The two-headed bieventive analysis, on the other hand, predicts the 
implicit cause in a structure such as (8) to necessarily be an event. Interpretations 
where there is an implicit event participant should not be possible since this 
would require an external thematic relation and hence the presence of Voice. This 
analysis thus predicts the existence of causatives which assert the existence of a 
causing event without relating any participant to it. Hence any context requiring 
the existence of such a participant, such as a purpose-clause, should be 
incompatible with (8). 
As regards the predictions of the one-headed bieventive analysis, a 
straightforward version of it would seem to predict that the implicit argument of a 
structure such as (8) should always be an event participant, rather than an event. 
However, as I. Heim points out (p.c .) ,  there is a possible version of this theory 
where one of the external thematic relations is more or less identificational, such 
as the external theta-role of a verb such as occur, which would allow us to 
interpret the implicit argument as an event. If we assume such a version of this 
theory, it, once again, makes the same predictions as the theta-role view: we 
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should be able to interpret an implicit cause either as an event or as an event 
participant. 
In the rest of this paper I show that Japanese adversity causatives and Finnish 
desiderative causatives are both causatives which (a) lack an external argument 
and (b) imply a cause which is necessarily interpreted as an event. Thus these data 
provide an argument for a two-headed bieventive treatment of causatives. I first 
discuss the Japanese, then the Finnish, and finally show how the core of the 
analysis can be maintained also in a language, such as English, where causatives 
without an external argument are not possible. 
3. Japanese adversity causatives 
In Japanese, a causativized un accusative is ambiguous between a regular causative 
interpretation, (9a), and the so-called adversity interpretation where the 
nominative argument is interpreted as an affected possessor-argument, rather than 
as a causer, (9b) (Oehrle and Nishio 198 1 ,  Miyagawa 1989, Kuroda 1979, 1993, 
Shibatani 1994, Harley 1995, Pylkkanen 2000a,b) : 
(9) Taroo-ga musuko-o 
Taro-NOM son-ACC 
sin-ase-ta. 
die-CAUSE-PAST 
(a) 'Taro caused his son to die '  
(b) 'Taro ' s  son died on him' (the adversity causative) 
The adversity causative is puzzling because it displays causative morphology but 
does not have an obviously causative meaning. However, what I wish to show 
here is that it does, in fact, have a causative meaning and that its causative 
meaning is exactly of the kind predicted to exist by the two-headed bieventive 
analysis and not by the others . In other words, I will show that the adversity 
causative asserts the existence of a causing event without relating any participant 
to it. To do this, I will first show that the nominative argument of the adversity 
causative is not an external argument. Then, I will give evidence for the existence 
of a causing event in the meaning of the structure. And finally, I will show that the 
structure does not have an implicit external argument, i .e . that it is not a passive. 
If the nominative, affected argument was an external argument, we would 
expect to be able to passivize the structure and get a meaning where there is an 
implicit affected argument. However, passivization makes the adversity reading of 
a causative dissappear, (10 ,  ii) : 
( 10) Musuko-ga 
son-NOM 
sin-ase-rare-ta. 
die-CAUSE-PASS-PAST 
(i) 'The son was caused to die' 
(ii) * ' Somebody' s son died on them' (implicit affected argument) 
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Thus there is evidence that the nominative argument is not an external argument 
but rather a derived subject. 
Even though the adversity causative lacks an external argument, it has a 
causative meaning. The clearest way to demonstrate this is by contrasting it to a 
similar construction which, however, lacks the causative morphology. This 
construction is the so-called adversity passive, shown in ( 1 1 )  (Oehrle and Nishio 
198 1 ,  Miyagawa 1989, Kubo 1992, Pylkkanen 2000a,b): 
( 1 1 )  Taroo-ga musuko-ni sin-are-ta. 
Taroo-NOM son-DAT die-PASS-PAST 
'Taro ' s  son died on him' 
The meaning of the adversity passive seems similar to that of the adversity 
causative but its morphological spell-out is different. In what follows, I show that 
this semantic similarity is superficial only and that the adversity causative is, in 
fact, causative in meaning while the adversity passive is not. Thus the difference 
in their morphological realization is expected. 
The clearest indication of the semantic difference is the fact that the adversity 
causative combines with a ni-yotte by-phrase naming the causing event while the 
adversity passive does not: 
( 12) a. Adversity causative + by-phrase naming a causing event 
Taroo-ga sensoo-ni-yotte musuko-o sin-ase-ta 
Taroo-ga war-by son-ACC die-CAUSE-PAST 
'Taro ' s  son was caused to die on him by the war' 
b. Adversity passive + by-phrase naming a causing event 
*Taroo-ga sensoo-ni-yotte musuko-ni sin-are-ta 
Taroo-ga war-by son-DAT die-PASS-PAST 
'Taro' s  son died on him by the war' 
A ni-yotte by-phrase is a modifier that can be used to specify an implicit 
argument, as is shown by the passive in (1 3a) .  If the structure does not have an 
implicit argument, such as in an unaccusative, a ni-yotte-phrase is impossible, 
( 1 3b) : 
( 13) a. Passive: 
Nikki-ga Hanako-ni-yotte yom-are-ta . 
diary-NOM Hanako-BY read-PASS-PAST 
'The diary was read by Hanako' 
b. Unaccusative: 
*Yasai-ga Hanako-ni-yotte kusa-tta. 
Vegetable-NOM Hanako-BY rot-PAST 
' *The vegetable rotted by Hanako' 
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Importantly for my present purposes, a ni-yotte phrase can also modify event 
arguments, as is shown in ( 14) . Thus it is similar to the English by-phrase, as 
indicated by the translation of ( 14) :4 
( 14) Taro-wa kawa-wo oyogu koto ni-yotte mukougisi-ni watatta. 
Taro-TOP river-acc swim C by the-other-side-dat got 
'Taro got to the other side by swimming across the river' 
Thus there is evidence that the adversity causative has an implicit event argument 
which the adversity passive lacks. What remains to be shown is that this implicit 
argument is not an external argument. If it was an external argument, we would 
expect the by-phrase in ( 12a) to be able to specify not only the causing event, but 
also a participant of that event. However, if we replace the by-phrase in ( 12a) with 
one that specifies an agent rather than the causing event itself, the example 
becomes ungrammatical :  
( 15)  Adversity causative + by-phrase naming an agent 
*Taroo-ga Hanako-ni-yotte musuko-o sin-ase-ta 
Taroo-ga Hanako-by son-ACC die-CAUSE-PAST 
'Taro ' s  son was caused to die on him by Hanako ' 
The contrast between ( 12a) and ( 15) can only be accounted for under the two­
headed bieventive analysis :  the adversity causative involves a causative head 
introducing the causing event but no external argument. Since there is no Voice­
head relating a participant to the causing event, a ni-yotte phrase cannot specify an 
implicit event participant. This state of affairs is impossible both under the 
monoeventive and under the one-headed bieventive analysis :  in neither account 
could the interpretation of an implicit causer argument be limited to events only 
(see section 2.3 . 1 ) .  
The causativity of the adversity causative can be revealed in  other ways as 
well. For example, in a situation where there is no obvious cause, such as one 
where Taro ' s  old father passes away, only the adversity passive, and not the 
adversity causative is natural : 
( 16) a. Adversity passive: 
Taroo-ga titioya-ni sin-are-ta. 
Taro-NOM father-DAT die-PASS-PAST 
'Taro was affected by his father dying' 
Context: Taro' s father dies of natural causes . 
b. Adversity causative: 
#Taroo-ga titioya-o sin-ase-ta. 
Taro-NOM father-ACC die-CAUSE-PAST 
'Taro was affected by his father dying' 
Context: Taro ' s  father dies of natural causes . 
1 39 
140 Liina Pylkldinen 
Also, if we combine these constructions with a phrase such as katteni, 'by 
itself/on one ' s  own' , the adversity passive is grammatical, and thus patterns with 
unaccusatives, while the adversity causative is contradictory. 
( 17) a. Adversity causative + 'by itself' : 
??Taroo-ga musuko-o katteni korob-ase-ta 
Taro-NOM son-ACC by.self fall .down-CAUSE-PAST 
'Something caused Taro ' s  son to fall down on him all by himself' 
b .  Adversity passive + 'by itself' : 
Taroo-ga musuko-ni katteni korob-are-ta 
Taro-NOM son-DAT by. self fall.down-PASS-PAST 
'Taro' s  son fell down on him all by himself' 
c .  Unaccusative + 'by itself' : 
Taroo-ga katteni koronda. 
Taro-NOM by.self fell. down 
'Taro fell down all by himself' 
Thus Japanese proves the existence of the type of unaccusative causative structure 
predicted by a theory where the causative relation is syntactically separate from 
the external argument relation. The evidence discussed so far suggests that the 
structure of the adversity causative involves a causative head introducing a 
causing event and taking the structure of the adversity passive as its complement:s 
( 1 8) Adversity causative: 
CAUSE-P Ae. [(3e') Dying(e' )  & . . .  & CAUSE(e,e')]  
--------
CAUSE Ae. Dying(e) . . .  
M<s,I>.Ae. [(3e' )  f(e' )  ________ 
& CAUSE(e,e')]  structure o
f the adversity passive 
In the next section I show that the properties of desiderative causatives in Finnish 
also require a separation of causation from the external theta-role. 
4. Finnish desiderative causatives 
In Finnish, it is possible to causativize an unergative verb without introducing a 
new argument in the syntax. The result is a causative construction with a pre­
verbal partitive argument and a desiderative meaning. The translations in the 
examples in ( 19) reflect the way a native speaker would be likely to translate the 
constructions into English. 
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( 19) a. Maija-a laula-tta-a. 
Maija-PAR sing-CAUSE-3SG 
'Maija feels like singing' 
b. Maija-a naura-tta-a. 
Maija-PAR laugh-CAUSE-3SG 
'Maija feels like laughing' 
The desiderative causative is similar to the adversity causative in that it is realized 
with causative morphology even though it does not have an obviously causative 
meaning.6 However, in what follows I show that the relationship between the 
morphology we see and the meaning we get in ( 19) is, in fact, fully transparent. 
The desiderative causative is causative in meaning in exactly the same way that 
the Japanese adversity causative is :  it involves a causative head without a Voice 
head. To show this I will make a parallel argument to the one made in the 
previous section. First, I show that the preverbal partitive argument is not an 
external argument. Then, I provide evidence for the causativity of the desiderative 
causative and finally show that the construction does not involve an implicit 
external argument. 
The clearest indication of the fact that the partitive argument is not an 
external argument but a derived subject is its partitive case. In Finnish object case 
is partitive, rather than accusative, when the event described by the verb is atelic 
(for discussion, see e.g. Kiparsky 1997). Aspectual tests reveal that the 
desiderative causative is atelic , in fact, stative. The best evidence for its stativity 
comes from its present tense interpretation. As in English, only stative verbs in 
Finnish have a non-habitual interpretation in the present tense, as is illustrated in 
( 19a-b) . ( 19c) shows that in this respect the desiderative causative clearly patterns 
with statives: it has a "true" present tense interpretation in the present tense, i .e . it 
is not necessarily interpreted habitually. 
(20) a. Eventive: 
Maija aja-a avoauto-a. 
Maija.NOM drive-3SG convertible-PAR 
'Maija drives a convertible (habitually) ' 
b. Stative: 
Jussi osa-a ranska-a. 
Jussi-NOM know-3SG French-PAR 
'Jussi knows French (at present) ' 
c. Desiderative: 
Maija-a laula-tta-a. 
Maija-PAR sing-CAUSE-3SG 
'Maija feels like singing (at present) ' 
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Given that the desiderative causative is stative, partitive case on the preverbal 
argument is expected if it is an underlying object. This is because partitive object 
case is always retained by a derived subject as is shown by the passive of a stative 
verb in (2 1 )  (AGR stands for impersonal agreement) : 
(2 1 )  Pekka-a 
Pekka-PAR 
rakaste-ta-an. 
love-PASS-AGR 
'Pekka is loved' 
The partitive argument thus exhibits the properties of a derived subject of a stative 
verb. It is, however, worth mentioning that in Finnish also external arguments can 
appear in the partitive case. Importantly, though, this is only possible with plural 
and mass nouns : a singular external argument in the partitive is ungrammatical, as 
(22c) shows. 
(22) a. Mass: 
Karja-a juoksi kedo-lla. 
cattle-PAR ran field-ADE 
'Cattle was running in the field' 
b. Plural : 
Miehi-a lauloi kato-lla. 
men-PAR sang roof-ADE 
'Some men were singing on the roof' 
c. Singular: 
*Miesta lauloi kato-lla 
man-PAR sang roof-ADE 
'A (part of a) man was singing on the roof' 
Since with the desiderative causative, partitive case is grammatical also in the 
singular, we know that the argument it appears on is not the external argument. 
Despite the lack of an external argument, the desiderative causative is 
causative in meaning. In other words, we can show that it is semantically distinct 
from a construction that simply asserts the existence of a desire, such as (23) :  
(23) Halua-isi-n naura-a. 
want-COND-ISG laugh-INF 
'1 would like to laugh' 
The evidence for the causativity of the desiderative causative comes from the fact 
that the causing event introduced by its causative morpheme can be questioned, 
(24a) . This, naturally, is not possible with the purely desiderative construction, 
(24b): 
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(24) a. Minu-a naura-tta-a mutt-en tieda mika. 
I-PAR laugh-CAUSE-3SG but-not. lSG know what.NOM 
'Something makes me feel like laughing but I don' t  know what (makes 
me feel like laugh) ' 
b. *Halua-isi-n nauraa mutt-en tieda mika. 
want-COND- lSG laugh but-not. l SG know what.NOM 
'I would like to laugh but I don' t  know what (makes me want to 
laugh) ' 
This indicates that the desiderative causative has some implicit argument that the 
sluicing-type construction above can pick up and that is absent in the purely 
desiderative sentence. But as with the Japanese, we must make sure that this 
implicit argument is not an external argument. Indeed, if we change the wh word 
of the construction in (24a) to kuka 'who' , which would question an event 
participant rather than an event, the construction becomes ungrammatical : 
(25) *Minu-a naura-tta-a mutt-en tieda kuka. 
I-PAR laugh-CAUSE-3SG but-not. lSG know who.NOM 
'Something makes me feel like laughing but I don' t  know who (makes 
me feel like laughing) ' 
Thus the Finnish desiderative causative has the same restriction as the 
Japanese adversity causative: its implicit argument must be interpreted as an 
event. This means that it also requires the separation of causation from the 
external thematic relation. In other words, in Finnish and in Japanese the 
functional elements CAUSE and Voice are independent of each other and 
therefore all of the three structures below occur: 
(26) a. VoiceP 
� 
x � 
Voice CAUSE-P 
� 
CAUSE � 
b. CAUSE-P 
� 
CAUSE� 
c. VoiceP 
� 
x � 
Voice � 
Since there are languages which force us to separate CAUSE from Voice, the 
strongest theory would maintain this separation universally, so that CAUSE would 
never introduce an external argument: 
(27) CAUSE: Af<s,t>.Ae. [(3e' )  fee ' )  & CAUSE(e,e ' )] 
However, since English, for example, does not seem to have structures such as the 
one in (26b), something more needs to be said. In the final section of this paper I 
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propose a way to rule out the structure in (26b) in languages such as English while 
maintaining the argument structure in (27) universally. 
5. English causatives 
In English, causativization seems to always bring an external argument with it. 
Thus either the English causative head is some wholly different element from 
(27), or the lack of causatives without an external argument follows from 
something else. In this section I will pursue the latter line of thinking. 
My proposal builds on the assumption that one source of crosslinguistic 
variation is the way universal functional elements are mapped into the syntactic 
heads of a particular language. This idea has been extensively researched in the 
domain of tense and agreement, where it has been proposed that some languages 
realize these two elements in one functional head while others realize them in two 
(Iatridou 1990, Speas 199 1 ,  Ouhalla 199 1 ,  Bobaljik 1995, Bobaljik and 
Thntinsson 1998). 
Here I would like to extend this type of explanation into the verbal 
domain. In other words, I would like to propose that the reason why English does 
not have unaccusative causatives is that in the English lexicon CAUSE and the 
external thematic relation form a unit and that this is why CAUSE cannot be 
merged into the syntax without the external theta-role.7 In other words, in English 
the causative relation and the external theta-role are "packaged" into one 
morpheme: 
(28) The English zero causative morpheme: [CAUSE, SEXT] ,  where 
CAUSE: Af<s,(>.Ae. [(3e ' )  fee ' )  & CAUSE(e,e ' )] and 
SEXT: Ax.Ae. SEXT(e,x) 
The proposal here is in line with the Distributed Morphology assumption that 
morphemes are bundles of features and that it is these feature bundles that occur 
in the terminal nodes of syntax (Halle and Marantz 1993 and subsequent work) . 
There is , however, something new about the present proposal, and that is that (28) 
maps two interpretable features into one morpheme, and hence into one syntactic 
head. Thus we are faced with a question about how to interpret the structure that 
this gives us, i .e . (29). 
(29) VoiceP 
� 
Mary Voice' 
� 
[CAUSE, Sext]� 
break glass 
The meaning that we want for the Voice' node is the same one as the two­
headed version of (29) would yield, i .e . we want the causative meaning to apply 
first so that the external argument can then be related to the causing, rather than 
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the caused, event (see (4» . However, CAUSE and 8EXT cannot combine with 
each other by Functional Application or by Event Identification to produce a 
meaning that would introduce both a causing event and an external argument. 
This is because both CAUSE and 8EXT need to combine with a function from 
events to truth values and neither of them is of that type. Hence CAUSE and 8EXT 
are a unit syntactically only and this is how the present proposal differs from the 
one-headed bieventive analysis in (2) where these two meanings are a unit also 
semantically. 
Since having CAUSE and 8EXT combine with each other is not a possibility, 
they must apply to the complement of Voice one at a time. I will assume that this 
is done in whatever order is possible. In the case at hand, only one order is 
possible, i .e . CAUSE must apply before 8EXT• The other order would result in a 
type mismatch since CAUSE could not combine with a constituent that has an 
unsaturated e-type argument, i .e . the external argument. Thus I will assume that 
the interpretation of (29) proceeds as in (29 ' ) , where the contents of the 
semantically complex Voice-head are interpreted in two steps: 8 
(29 ' )  VoiceP Ae. [8EXT(e,M)&(3e')Breaking(e')&Th(e' ,gl) & CAUSE(e,e' ) ]  
Ma� 
STEP2 (8EXT(CAUSE break glass)) :  Ax.Ae. [9EXT(e,x)& (3e' )  Breaking(e')&Tb(e' ,gl)& CAUSE(e,e')] 
STEP} (CAUSE(break glass)) :  Ae. [(3e' )Breaking (e' )  & Tb(e' ,glass) & CAUSE(e,e ' )] 
--------
Ae. [Breaking(e) & Th(e,glass)] 
� 
break glass 
5. Summary 
In this paper I have examined the argument structure of the functional element 
that allows the derivation of causative predicates from noncausative ones. 
Specifically, the question I investigated was the following: if there were only one 
such element crosslinguistically available, what would its properties have to be? 
The evidence I brought to bear on this question were causative constructions in 
Japanese and in Finnish where we could show the existence of a causative 
meaning while tests pertaining to the existence of an external argument failed. 
Given the properties of these constructions, I argued that any account where 
causativization either is equated with the introduction of an external argument (i .e. 
the theta-role view) or entails the introduction of an exte1l)al argument (i .e. the 
one-headed bieventive view) is not crosslinguistically tenable. Rather, what the 
Japanese and Finnish data show, is that a causative meaning that is separate from 
the external argument relation must be one of the basic elements of argument 
structure (see Baker and Stewart 1 999 for recent work arriving at the same 
conclusion). 
Given the necessity of the separation, I then made a proposal about how it 
could be maintained even in a language where causativization does, in fact, entail 
introducing an external argument. I did this by making the syntactic assumption 
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that in these languages the causative relation is expressed in the same syntactic 
head with the external argument relation, rather than by modifying the semantics 
of CAUSE. Since in these languages CAUSE and 8EXT are a syntactic unit, we do 
not expect them to have unaccusative causatives, which is the correct result. 
Endnotes 
• I wish to thank especially Alec Marantz and Shigeru Miyagawa for extensive 
discussions on these materials and Shigeru for all his help with the Japanese data. 
I also wish to thank Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim, Sabine latridou, Angelika 
Kratzer, David Pesetsky and the audience at SALTX for their comments and 
criticisms. The Japanese data in this paper report judgments of Ken Hiraiwa, 
Shinichiro Ishihara, Shigeru Miyagawa and Shogo Suzuki to whom I am grateful 
for their time and patience. 
1 I won't  consider lexicalist approaches to causativization here nor theories where 
the unaccusative alternant of the alternating pair is considered to assert the 
existence of a cause (e.g. Levin and Rappaport 1995), but see e.g. Marantz 1997 
and Pylkkanen 1999a for discussion. 
2 It is, however, important to keep in mind that the monoeventive view is not 
incompatible with the notion that causation is a relation between two events. We 
could define a semantics for the Causer-relation such that to be a Causer of some 
event e means to participate in some other event e '  which causes e. This analysis, 
however, crucially differs from the bieventive analyses discussed in section 2.2 in 
that the causing event which is part of the meaning of the Causer-role would not 
be available for modification in the syntax. 
3 For arguments for this particular analysis of passives, see Embick 1997. 
4 Thanks to J. Higginbotham for pointing out the relevance of this type of data to 
me and to K. Hiraiwa for this example. It should be noted though, that the 
Japanese ni-yotte phrase is more limited in its ability to modify event arguments 
than the English by-phrase. For example, while (14) is perfectly natural, a 
sentence such as I went there by walking cannot be expressed with a ni-yotte 
phrase. What is relevant for my purposes here, is that a ni-yotte phrase can modify 
an event argument even if at present I do not understand all its restrictions .  
5 The structure of adversity passives is analyzed in more detail in Pylkkanen 
2000a,b. 
6 Another puzzle about the desiderative causative is, of course, the source of its 
desiderative meaning. However, similar constructions with overt desiderative 
morphology exist in other languages, such as Tohonno O'Odham (see Zepeda 
1987), and therefore we can make the plausible assumption that in the Finnish 
construction the same desiderative morphology is present although unpronounced. 
7 The external theta-role is of course available independently of CAUSE since not 
every transitive verb is a causative. 
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8 The same result could of course be achieved by combining CAUSE and 8EXT 
with each other by Function Composition. However, at this point I do not have 
any evidence to distinguish between these two alternatives . I hypothesize (29 ' )  
since i t  makes the interpretation of the one-headed tree proceed in  exactly the 
same way as the interpretation of the corresponding two-headed tree. In this 
proposal the bundling of CAUSE and 8EXT is in every way syntactic only, which is 
what I intend to propose here. 
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